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Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime Regulation
Elizabeth S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg*
The question of how lawmakers should respond to developmental differences between
adolescents and adults in formulating juvenile crime policy has been the subject of debate for a
generation. A theme of the punitive law reforms that dismantled the traditional juvenile justice
system in the 1980s and 1990s was that adolescents were not different from adults in any way
that was relevant to criminal punishment–or at least that any differences were trumped by the
demands of public safety.1 But this view has been challenged in recent years; scholars and courts
have recognized that adolescents, due to their developmental immaturity, are less culpable than
are adults and that the principle of proportionality requires that teens be punished less severely
for their criminal offenses.2 Moreover, some scholars have invoked developmental research to
challenge the core assumption underlying the punitive law reforms that harsh sanctions promote
public safety and reduce the social cost of juvenile crime.3
In this Article we argue that a developmental model of juvenile crime regulation
grounded in scientific knowledge about adolescence is both fairer to young offenders and more
likely to promote social welfare than a regime that fails to attend to developmental research. We
challenge punitive reformers who presume that public safety is enhanced and social welfare
promoted if serious juvenile offenders are punished as adults- and who are unconcerned about
whether their approach is compatible with principles of fair punishment. We focus here
primarily on the social welfare argument for a separate and more lenient juvenile justice system
grounded in a developmental framework– for several reasons. First, the argument for mitigation

*
Elizabeth Scott is the Harold R. Medina Professor of Law at Columbia University. Laurence Steinberg is
the Laura Carnell Distinguished University Professor at Temple University. This essay is based in part on
ELIZABETH SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE (2008).
1
Matthew Wagman, Innocence Lost in the Wake of Green: The Trend is ClearnIf You Are Old Enough to
Do the Crime, You Are Old Enough to Do the Time, 49 Catholic University Law Review 49 (2000): 643–677, 643
2

See ELIZABETH SCOTT AND LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 118-148 (2008). The
Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) announced that to impose the death penalty on a juvenile
was cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution; although the Court
offered several rationales for its conclusion, the heart of the opinion was a proportionality analysis that emphasized
the developmental immaturity of adolescents. Id. at _ . The Court based this analysis on Laurence Steinberg &
Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility and
the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 1009 (Dec. 2003). In 2019 the Court followed Roper in
holding that sentencing a juvenile to life without parole for a non-homicide offense violates the Eighth Amendment.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. _ (2010).
3

SCOTT & STEINBERG, Id at 181-222. . A few scholars have gone a step further, arguing that public safety
should be the only goal of juvenile crime regulation. See Christopher Slobogin & Mark Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice:
The Fourth Option, IOWA L. REV. (2010)
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on the grounds of developmental immaturity is more familiar; and although it supports less
punishment, it provides no strong basis for a separate justice system.4 Moreover, lawmakers and
the public care about accountability, but they may care even more about public safety; fears
about the threat of young “superpredators” propelled the transformation of juvenile crime policy
that took place in the late 20th century.5 Thus a regime that deals with juveniles more leniently
than adults (because they deserve less punishment) is likely to fail in the political arena if public
safety is imperiled. In short, the viability of the developmental model depends on evidence that
the punitive response of the past generation is not only inconsistent with basic principles of
fairness, but also that it has failed to minimize the social cost of juvenile crime, and that
regulation based on social science research is more likely to attain this goal.
The recent reforms embodied a view that society's interests are promoted by tough
incarceration policies under which more youths are dealt with in the adult system and offenders
in the juvenile system are incarcerated for longer periods of time.6 The claim that these
measures will reduce juvenile crime is critical to the social welfare justification for more
punitive sanctions, but it turns out to be hard to evaluate. Juvenile crime indeed has declined
since its peak in the early 1990s, but the causes of the decline are complex.7 As we will see,
studies that have examined the impact on youth crime rates of the adoption of punitive policies
yield mixed results, offering little support for the claim that the declining crime rates are largely
due to the enactment of harsher laws.8
Evaluating the impact of the punitive reforms also requires consideration of factors other
than crime rates. First are the economic costs of tough laws which are substantial, as legislatures
4

Barry Feld has argued for a unitary justice system in which juveniles receive a “youth discount” and
receive shorter sentences. BARRY FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
(1999); Barry Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 Minn. Law Review 691(1991).
5

This term was coined by University of Pennsylvania criminologist John DiIulio, who in 1995 predicted
that the new century would bring a juvenile crime wave far worse than the 1990s. John DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of
the Super-predators, Weekly Standard, Nov. 27, 1995. DiIulio later expressed regret for the hyperbole and
acknowledged that the prediction had not come to pass. Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-Theorist on Young
‘Superpredators’, Bush Aide Has Regrets New York Times, Feb. 9, 2001, A19.
6

Albert Regnery’s views were typical of critics of the traditional juvenile court who endorsed tough
sanctions for young offenders.
7

See t.an. 48to 52 infra. For example, many states enacted punitive reforms after crime rates began to fall,
suggesting that other factors have played a role. The adoption of Proposition 21 in California is a good example. In
2000, when the referendum making transfer easier passed, juvenile crime rates had been declining for 5 or 6 years.
See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2 at 102-117.
8

See t.a.n.53 to 80 infra

3

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1662579

and government agencies are beginning to recognize.9 Resources spent on building and staffing
correctional facilities needed to incarcerate more juveniles for longer periods are not available
for other social uses. Even assuming that tough sanctions can reduce juvenile crime, at some
point the additional dollars expended may not offer enough benefit to be justified.10 Also, if less
costly correctional dispositions are effective at reducing recidivism in some young offenders,
then incarcerating those youths may not be justified on utilitarian grounds. Finally, included in
the calculus are the intangible and sometimes iatrogenic effects of correctional programs on the
future welfare of young offenders. Social welfare is affected by correctional policies and
programs that either reduce or enhance the prospect that young offenders will lead satisfying
lives.
In this Article, we examine empirical evidence that can inform our thinking about
optimal justice policies and how social welfare is likely to be affected by various approaches.
This evidence is varied; it includes studies of the economic costs of various sanctions, the
deterrent impact of statutory changes, recidivism rates of different groups of offenders and the
effectiveness of different kinds of programs. No single body of research provides a clear answer
to our normative question, but the complex empirical account that emerges indicates that the use
of adult sanctions usually does not promote social welfare, and that differential treatment of
juvenile offenders is justified on consequentialist as well as retributive grounds. On our view, the
research supports the conclusion that adult punishment and longer incarceration in the juvenile
system have contributed somewhat to a reduction in juvenile crime, largely through
incapacitation. But the costs have been high and the societal benefits likely are limited to a far
smaller group of young offenders than are subject to harsh penalties under current law.11

9

This has become a key issue in adult sentencing as well. See Rachel Barkow, Federalism and the Politics
of Sentencing, 105 Columbia. L. Rev. 1276. Barkow argues that cost considerations can function as an important
constraint on punitive sentencing policies, and points to state legislatures that have retreated from harsh sentencing
reforms in the face of rising costs. She points out that in the 1990s, state governments doubled the amount spent on
corrections due to get-tough policies. Id at 1287. For a discussion of the rising costs of juvenile crime, see t.a.n. _ to
_ infra.
10

Economists find that increasing incarceration rates has diminishing marginal returns. Some amount of
incarceration yields substantial benefits in terms of decreased crime, but those benefits decrease (ie fewer crimes are
avoided) for each unit of increased incarceration. See The Criminal Justice System in Washington State:
Incarceration Rates, Taxpayer Costs, Crime Rates and Prison Economics, January 2003. Washington State Institute
of Public Policy, available at wsipp.wa.gov
11

Social welfare may well be promoted by imposing tough sanctions on youths who are chronic serious
offenders. These youths are classified by Terrie Mofftt as “life-course persistent offenders.” Terrie Moffitt,
Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 PSYCH.
REV. 674 (1993). Many criminologists have found that a small percentage of juvenile offenders commit a high
percentage of juvenile crimes. MARVIN WOLFGANG, ROBERT SIGLIO & THORSTEIN SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A
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Moreover, extensive research indicates that less costly sanctions in the juvenile system,
including community-based programs, may be effective at reducing recidivism.12
Our social welfare analysis is informed by scientific knowledge of adolescence and youth
crime which reinforces the conclusion that policies based on broad use of incarceration are
unlikely to minimize the social cost of juvenile crime. An important lesson of the developmental
research is that most young law-breakers are normative adolescent offenders, whose criminal
activities are linked to developmental forces and who can be expected to "mature out" of their
antisocial tendencies.13 Therefore, there is no reason to assume that these youths are headed for
a career in crime unless correctional interventions push them in that direction. The research also
shows that social context is critically important to the successful completion of developmental
tasks that are essential to the transition to conventional adult roles associated with desistance
from crime. For young offenders, correctional programs shape that social context and can
enhance or inhibit this process. Today, many teens without prior records are swept into the adult
criminal justice system, by any account a harsh developmental environment. Even in the
juvenile systems in many states, young offenders are incarcerated for long periods in prison-like
facilities. Developmental research supports other evidence indicating that enthusiasm for
imposing harsh sanctions on young offenders is misguided and that policies grounded in
developmental research are far more likely to reduce the social cost of juvenile crime.
Developmental research not only informs policies that promote social welfare; it also
provides the foundation for a regime committed to fair and proportionate punishment of young
offenders. Recently, some scholars have advocated an approach to juvenile justice dedicated
solely to crime reduction,14 but we are persuaded that both social welfare and fairness are
essential components in a viable and stable regime. Although society’s primary goal in
responding to juvenile crime may well be preventive in nature, the principle of retribution is a
necessary check on government power in this context. The retributive principle of
proportionality functions importantly as a side constraint, limiting the duration of correctional
interventions to what is deserved on the basis of the seriousness of the offense and the offender’s
culpability. In contrast, under a pure prevention approach, the government is free to intervene in

BIRTH COHORT (1972). DAVID FARRINGTON, LLOYD OHLIN & THORSTEN SELLIN, UNDERSTANDING AND
CONTROLLING CRIME(1986) (5% commit 50% of crimes)..
12

See t.a.n 126 to 137 infra.

13

Moffitt calls this group “adolescent-limited” offenders. Supra note 11. See note 172 infra.

14

See Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 3.
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the lives of individual offenders to the extent deemed necessary to prevent crime.15 The potential
for unfairness under that approach is substantial–both in the form of excessive punishment and in
the potential for variations in responses to offenders based on considerations related to risk but
not linked to the crime itself.16 This unfairness undermines the legitimacy of the justice system,
and it can be avoided by incorporating proportionality as well as prevention into the
developmental framework.
The essay proceeds as follows. Part I describes the increased use of incarceration in both
the adult and juvenile systems under the law reforms of the last generation and examines the
resulting impact on state budgets. This raises the question of whether the substantial cost
increases are justified by a reduction in juvenile crime. Part II examines the theoretical basis for
assuming that the reforms should result in lower crime rates and then offers the available
empirical evidence on this issue. This evidence includes studies of the impact of legislative
change as well as comparative studies of recidivism in the adult and juvenile systems; in
combination, the research provides little support for the assumption that the punitive reforms
have reduced crime beyond reductions attributable to incapacitation. Part III introduces
scientific research on adolescence that underscores the important impact of correctional
interventions and settings on developmental trajectories and on reoffending. This developmental
research reinforces the conclusion that for most juveniles, long incarceration increases the social
cost of crime and should be used only when public safety is at stake. The research also clarifies
that some community programs can lower these costs. Part IV turns to retribution and
proportionality, and applying developmental research, concludes that mitigation should be
applied to the crimes of juveniles. We argue that retribution must be incorporated as a limiting
principle in any legitimate and stable system of juvenile crime regulation.
I. Youths Behind Bars: The Expanding Net and its Financial Cost
We begin by taking a closer look at the implementation of the punitive law reforms in
juvenile justice and their financial impact on state budgets- the most concrete costs of the legal
changes. How have the new laws changed the way juveniles are actually being processed and
punished? As a result of the reforms, a large number of youths who previously would have been
under exclusive juvenile court jurisdiction are potentially subject to processing and punishment

15

The boundary for intervention under the Slobogin and Fondacaro’s argument is the maximum age of
juvenile court jurisdiction. They reject transfer to adult court. Id at 114.
16
For example, longer dispositions may be imposed on offenders who lack parental support which may
relevant to treatment response.
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as adults. This does not mean, however, that all or even most youths who could be subject to
criminal prosecution today are actually tried and punished as adults. Indeed, the impact of
statutes expanding the discretionary authority of judges to transfer youths has been modest.17
But the widespread enactment of legislative waiver statutes that categorically redefine juveniles
as adults has resulted in adult prosecution and punishment of many youths who previously would
have been kept in the juvenile system. This change, together with longer sentences in the
juvenile system, has greatly increased the number of incarcerated youths in this country. This in
turn has resulted in legislatures devoting a greater portion of their budgets to juvenile corrections
than was true a generation ago.
A. The Trend Toward Incarceration
In some states, the tough reforms seem to have had little effect on the adjudication and
disposition of young criminals. For example, emerging evidence suggests that California's
Proposition 21, which greatly expanded the categories of youths susceptible to criminal court
adjudication, has had a more modest impact on prosecutorial and judicial practices than was
predicted by either supporters and opponents.18 In other states, however, the impact of
tougher laws has been substantial. During the 1980s and 1990s, many states categorically
lowered the age of criminal court jurisdiction for a broad range of serious crimes and a few states
lowered the general jurisdictional age from 18 to 17 or 16. In this way, groups of juveniles have
been reclassified categorically as adults for purposes of criminal prosecution.19
More information is available about youths who are tried as adults as a result of
discretionary judicial transfer than those who are subject to criminal prosecution under
legislative waiver or automatic transfer statutes. The number of youths transferred by judges fell

17

See t.a.n. 19 infra.

18

For a discussion of Proposition 21, see SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 2 at 102 to 117. See Anna
Gorman, Few D.A.s Use New Power to Try Juveniles as Adults, L.A. TIMES at 1 (Aug. 8, 2004)
19

Wisconsin, New Hampshire and Wyoming have lowered the general jurisdictional age in the past
generation. Altogether, 14 states set the upper boundary of the juvenile court jurisdictional age below age 18.
HOWARD SNYDOR & MELISSA SICKMOND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT, available at
http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf. As of 2004, 29 states categorically exclude certain
juveniles from juvenile court jurisdiction. These include states that set the jurisdictional age below 18, generally or
for felonies, as well as states that mandate that youths charged with specific serious crimes be tried as adults. Fifteen
states make judicial waiver mandatory for certain offenses, if certain criteria are met. See Patrick Griffin, National
Overviews, STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE PROFILES. NAT’L CENTER FOR JUV. JUSTICE (2006). Rhode Island lowered the
jurisdictional age from 18 to 16 and then raised it again six months later. Ray Henry, Rhode Isand Lawmakers
Repeal Law Imprisoning Teens, Assoc. Press, Oct. 31, 2007.
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from a high of 12,000 in 1996 to about 7,000 in 2002.20 The percentage of transfer cases that
involve violent offenses against persons was slightly higher than property and drug offenses.21 A
large proportion of transferred teens are 16 or 17 years old; judges are less likely to transfer
youths aged 15 or younger, although the number of youths under age 15 who were transferred
doubled between 1985 and 2002.22 African American juveniles are far more likely to be
transferred than their white counterparts. Statistics from the 1990s indicated that more than 60%
of transferred youths were convicted of their offenses and, of those convicted, about 70 % were
incarcerated in prison or jail.23
A far larger number of youths under the age of 18 are subject to criminal prosecution
under legislative waiver statutes than are subject to judicial transfer, but we lack good statistics
on how many youths are subject to adult punishment under these statutes.24 Thirty eight states
mandate adult criminal prosecution for some categories of young defendants under the age of 18
(based on the offense charged) and about a dozen set the age of general jurisdiction for adult
criminal prosecution at age 16 or 17 when youths are legal minors for most other purposes.25
According to recent estimates, about 250,000 teens, mostly 16 and 17 year olds, are
automatically subject to criminal prosecution and punishment annually under legislative
jurisdictional and waiver statutes.26
Youths who are convicted in criminal court are more likely to be incarcerated for their
offenses, and, according to recent studies, are confined for substantially longer periods on

20

SNYDOR & SICKMOND, .id. at 186.

21

Id. Transfer for drug offenses have increased substantially since the mid-1980s.

22

Id. At 186. . Twenty-three states have no minimum age for transfer to criminal court; the rest have
minimum ages ranging from 10 to 15 years of age. Id., available at
http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/overviews/transfer5.asp 11/1/09.
23

Id.

24
The absence of age data on youths categorically classified as adults is due to the fact that information
about age is usually not included in statistics about criminal charges, convictions and sentences of adults.
25

See ncjj.org/stateprofiles/overviews, at note 18 supra. In New York, for example, general juvenile court
jurisdiction ends at age 16 and jurisdiction for murder ends at age 13. Id.
26

Id.

8

average than those who are sentenced in juvenile court.27 Much of the best empirical data on
these issues (and generally on the impact of juvenile justice policies and practices) is produced
by the Washington State Institute for Public Policy.28 In one study, Institute researchers
compared average minimum sentence lengths before and after the 1994 enactment of a statute
automatically transferring to adult court 16 and 17 year old youths charged with certain violent
crimes, that previously had been subject to discretionary judicial transfer. The researchers found
sentences to be 50% longer for crimes that met the automatic transfer criteria than under the
judicial waiver regime, when fewer than 25% of youths charged with these crimes were tried as
adults.29 Fifteen per cent of youths automatically transferred to adult court received sentences
of 5 years or more, whereas no youths retained in juvenile court before 1994 received such
lengthy sentences.30 Because jurisdiction in the juvenile correctional system in most states ends
by age 21 or earlier, some youths who are prosecuted as adults receive sentences many time as
long as the maximum period of confinement in a juvenile facility.
That is not to say that young offenders today are subject to lenient treatment in the
juvenile system; delinquency dispositions have also become harsher under the recent policy
reforms. Youths are more likely to be confined in secure juvenile facilities and confined for
longer periods than a generation ago. According to another Washington study, confinement
rates in that state's juvenile system increased by 40% during the 1990s– during a period when

27

The Washington Institute of Public Policy has found that youths tried as adults receive substantially
longer sentences. See Robert Barnoski, CHANGES IN WASHINGTON STATE'S JURISDICTION OF YOUNG OFFENDERS:
EXAMINING THE IMPACT, WASH. INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY http://www.wsipp.wa.gov: January 2003 at 16-20.
Barnoski found that under Washington's discretionary transfer law, youths who were transferred received an average
sentence of almost 6 years as compared to those retained in juvenile court who received less than a year. The
combined average was 1.78 years. After the enactment of the state's automatic transfer law (under which all youths
were tried as adults), the average was 2.8 years. See note _ supra. See also Jeffrey Fagan, The Comparative Impacts
of Juvenile and Criminal Court Sanctions on Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 L & Policy Rev. 77 (1996). In a
comparative study, Fagan found that 46% of youths convicted of robbery were sentenced to prison or jail for first
offenses in New York, while, in New Jersey, 18% of those processed as juveniles were incarcerated. For a
discussion of Fagan's study, see t.a.n._ to 77infra.
28

This research institute was created by the state legislature to study the cost effectiveness of justice system
(and other social) legislation and policies, primarily in Washington, but nationally as well. The institute conducts
sophisticated and comprehensive research that is an important source of information in evaluating the costs and
benefits of legal regulation. http://www.wsipp.wa.gov.
29

See Barnoski, supra note 26 at 17-18. The study examined cases over a two and one half year period
before the enactment of the statute (January 1, 1992 to July 1, 1994) and a similar period after enactment (January 1,
1998 to July 1, 2001). In the "before" group, 738 youths were retained in juvenile court and 175
transferred. In the “after” group, 690 youths were tried as adults.
30
Id at 17-18. Under discretionary transfer, 35% of transferred youths received a sentence of 5 years or
more, but less than 25% of youths were transferred.
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serious crime rates fell by 50%. In the late 1980s, 2.5 out of 1000 Washington youths were
confined in juvenile facilities; a decade later the confinement rate increased to 3.5 youths per
1000.31
The upshot is that the best available evidence indicates that the punitive reforms have
resulted in substantial increases in the incarceration of juveniles, both in the adult criminal
justice system and in the juvenile system. In an era in which juvenile crime rates have declined,
more young law breakers are subject to incarceration and for longer periods, due primarily to the
combination of legislative waiver laws and tougher sanctions in the juvenile system.
B. The Economic Costs of the Punitive Reforms
The debate about the merits of the punitive reforms has focused primarily on whether the
increased use of incarceration has reduced juvenile crime and, to a lesser extent, on their impact
on young offenders. Interestingly, until recently, the economic costs associated with the
increased use of incarceration of juveniles received relatively little attention in the policy
debates.32 Economic expenditures are the most concrete costs of the policies we are examining,
and evaluating the benefit of any crime reduction impact requires that we know the financial cost
incurred. The headline is that the impact on state budgets of the recent justice reforms has been
substantial. Moreover, although juvenile crime has declined significantly since the early 1990s,
the costs of responding to youthful criminal activity have risen substantially. According to a
careful analysis of the costs and benefits associated with one state's policies responding to
juvenile crime, serious juvenile crime declined by 50% between 1994 and 2001, while
expenditures in the juvenile justice system increased by 43%.33
Not surprisingly, this increase in spending is due largely to the expanded use of
incarceration as the preferred (or required) sanction for young offenders. Longer sentences in
both the juvenile and criminal systems and the use of incarceration in place of community
sanctions add up to higher justice system costs. The cost of incarcerating a youth for a year in
the juvenile system varies in different states, depending on labor costs and the quality and kinds
31

Steven Aos, The Juvenile Justice System in Washington State: Recommendations to Improve Cost
Effectiveness; Wash. State Institute for Public Policy http://www.wsipp.wa.gov; October 2002 at 2..
32

In the past few years, legislatures have begun to examine the budgetary burden of harsh sanctions. This
issue has become quite prominent in deliberations about adult sentencing policy as legislatures across the country
have revised and moderated harsh sentencing regimes in response to evidence that criminal justice system costs had
doubled in the 1990s. See Rachel Barkow, supra note 9; D. WILHELM & N. TURNER, “IS THE BUDGET CRISIS
CHANGING THE WAY WE LOOK AT SENTENCING AND INCARCERATION? JUNE 2002, (VERA INSTITUTE.).
33

See Aos, supra note 30 supra.
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of programs provided. Costs range from $215,000 in New York youth prisons, $100,000 in
California, almost $90,000 in Virginia, $58,000 in Florida, to $45,000 in Washington.34 A year
of imprisonment in the adult system is less expensive than a year of incarceration in the juvenile
system, in part because prisons are less likely to provide educational and counseling services and
have a higher ratio of inmates to staff. Cost estimates per prisoner range from $25,000 to 40,000
per year.35 But, as we have suggested, criminal sentences generally are longer than juvenile
dispositions– and therefore are often costlier.36
The recent reforms have also generated increased procedural costs. In the juvenile
system, many cases that would have been dealt with informally 20 years ago are subject to
formal adjudication in juvenile court today.37 Increased costs are also associated with
prosecution and adjudication in criminal court. The procedural protections afforded defendants
and the time expended by judges, attorneys, jurors and law enforcement agents combine to make
criminal trials very expensive. Even when convictions are based on plea agreements, the costs
are far greater than are those of delinquency proceedings, which, even in the post-Gault era, tend
to be more informal, briefer, and simpler.
*
State governments today spend more money prosecuting and punishing juveniles than
they did in the early 1990s, when juvenile crime rates were far higher. These expenditures are
funded either by higher taxes or by shifting funds from other programs. Governors and
legislatures are usually reluctant to raise taxes, and thus they may cut allocations for public

34

In Virginia, a 2005 report by the Department of Juvenile Justice reported that the per capita cost of
holding one juvenile for a year was $88,271. Virginia Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, DATA RESOURCE GUIDE: FISCAL
YEAR 2005, APPENDIX. See also Barnoski, supra note 26 (describing yearly per youth cost of juvenile facility as
almost $45,000). Mayor Michael Bloomberg recently announced that New York City would greatly reduce the
number of youths incarcerated in “youth prisons,” citing a cost of $215,000 per year per youth. Julie Bosman, City
Signals Intent to Put Fewer Teenagers in Jail, N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 2010 at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/nyregion/21juvenile.html?scp=1&sq=bloomberg%20juveniles&st=cse
35

Costs in Washington were estimated at about $36,000. See Barnoski, supra note 26. Prisons have lower
costs per prisoner than juvenile facilities for several reasons. First, prisons are larger than juvenile facilities and thus
can reduce costs from economies of scale. The ratio of staff to inmates is usually much lower in juvenile facilities,
in part because inmates are not confined as restrictively. Moreover, juvenile facilities generally have more
counselors and teachers, and generally to offer more programming to inmates.
36

In Washington, the average cost of confinement per youth increased from $65,000 under the
discretionary transfer regime to $75,000 under the automatic transfer law. See Barnoski, supra note 26 at 20.
37

SNYDOR & SICKMOND, 2006, supra note 18.
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schools or social programs so that adequate funds are available for incarcerating juveniles.38 Are
these expenditures justified? From the perspective of social welfare, the answer depends on
whether two conditions are met– first, that the economic costs of incarceration policies (together
with other indirect costs that we will explore shortly) are offset by greater public benefits in
terms of reduced crime, and second, that these policies are more effective at accomplishing this
goal than other, less costly, policies.39 In the pages that follow we explore these conditions and
conclude that the evidence does not justify incarceration policies under current law.
II. The Effectiveness of Punitive Policies: Do Harsh Sanctions Reduce Crime?
We turn now to the question of whether youth crime policies based on expansive use of
incarceration are effective in accomplishing the goal of reducing youth crime. If so, several kinds
of benefits follow that may justify the increase in government spending. Economists include in
cost-benefit evaluations of crime policies the benefit to potential victims of crimes that are not
committed: Less crime will reduce costs that can include (depending on the crime) lost
possessions, physical pain and psychological distress, lost productivity, medical expenses and
lost lives. Less crime also enhances the well-being of citizens generally. The residential real
estate market illustrates the fact that people attach a monetary value to feeling safe as they go
about their lives– comparable housing is cheaper in high-crime neighborhoods than in those
where crime rates are low. Desistance from a life of crime (or avoidance of criminal activity
altogether) also offers intangible value to youths– in terms of their future well being and
productivity. Youths who are deterred from involvement in crime (or from re-offending) are
likely to experience benefits from lives that are more likely than those of young criminals to
include educational achievement, stable employment and rewarding intimate relationships.40
Finally, state expenditures on the operation of the justice system should decline if crime is

38

George Allen, Governor of Virginia during the 1990s, cut state health and education funding while
substantially increasing the budget of the Department of Corrections. Several prison construction projects were
undertaken during Allen's administration. See Virginia Legislature Rejects Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES at A21, Feb 5,
1995.
39

According to some estimates, one year of incarceration in the juvenile system costs between five and ten
times as much (depending on incarceration costs) as a year of community-based services, that, as we will see have
been found to be very effective in reducing future offending. See t.a.n. 125 to 137 infra.
40

Youths who persist in criminal activity tend to have poor educational outcomes, unstable relationships in
adulthood, and poor employment records; they also tend to be poor parents to their own children, who are more
likely to get involved in criminal activity than other children. See Terrie Moffitt, Avshalom Caspi, & Michael Rutter,
Measured Gene-Environment Interactions in Psychopathology. Concepts, Research Strategies, and Implications for
Research, Intervention, and Public Understanding of Genetics, 1 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 5-27
(2006).
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reduced, including not only the costs of operating correctional facilities and programs, but also
the costs of law enforcement and criminal proceedings.
Thus a critical question is whether harsh sanctions, which represent a substantial
financial investment, are an effective means of reducing crime, as proponents argue. To answer
that question, we first describe the political background of the period of punitive reforms, and
briefly describe why proponents thought tough policies would effectively reduce crime. We then
look at the empirical evidence on whether the claims have merit. This evidence is varied and
includes studies of the impact of legal change on crime rates and studies of the impact of
different correctional settings on reoffending.
A. The Traditional Regime and the Failure to Prevent Crime
To the punitive reformers of the late 1980s and 1990s, violent juvenile crime was a
critical threat to social welfare, one that was caused largely by the failure of rehabilitation and
the lax response to crime by traditional juvenile courts.41 On the view of critics, the juvenile
court was a "revolving door;" the typical young offender received a slap on the wrist from the
judge and was soon out on the street again engaging in criminal activity –until he got caught and
returned to court– and on and on. Youths were virtually invited to engage in criminal activities
by a regime that used community probation as the standard sanction. A delinquency charge
carried no deterrent threat because youths knew that no serious consequences would follow the
adjudication.42
The perception that juvenile court judges were unduly lenient was due in part to the naive
rhetoric that surrounded the traditional regime rather than to the reality of the juvenile justice
system. In fact, many youths who committed serious crimes were confined in secure
correctional facilities. However, there is some merit to the critics’ challenge that the system
failed to deter youths from engaging in criminal activity. Much anecdotal evidence indicates that
young criminals of a generation ago assumed that they were insulated from punishment by virtue
of their status as juveniles, and this may have encouraged some to engage (or persist) in
delinquent activities. Police officers reported that they were taunted during arrests by youths
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calling “I’m a juvie,” as though this meant they had a free pass to engage in criminal activity.
According to conventional wisdom, “adult” members of criminal gangs frequently assigned to
juveniles tasks that might result in arrest. Even Chris Simmons, whose death sentence the
Supreme Court overturned in 2005, was reported to believe that as a juvenile he would be treated
leniently.43 Thus, it is hard to deny that the traditional juvenile system not only failed in its
rehabilitation mission, but also was unsuccessful in deterring crime and incapacitating young
criminals.
There was another dimension to the claim that legal reforms were necessary to protect the
public from young criminals. In the 1990s, some observers predicted that, unless tough policies
were enacted, the country would face an even larger wave of violent youth crime in the first
decade of the 21st century as a large cohort of children born in the early 1990s became teenagers.
Several criminologists promoted this view, including John DiIullio, who warned politicians and
the public of a "coming generation of super-predators," youths without moral sensibilities who
would roam the streets in gangs, terrorizing the public with their violent and senseless
rampages.44 Thus, the policy goal of crime prevention took on an unprecedented urgency in the
face of this overwhelming threat and politicians embraced tough incarceration policies as the
means of protecting the public.
How did the punitive reformers think harsh sanctions would reduce crime? As first year
law students learn in their Criminal Law class, several preventive rationales justify criminal
punishment and may be offered in support of harsh juvenile crime policies.45 First, the threat of
punishment can generally deter future crime by discouraging youths from ever getting involved
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in criminal activity.46 Policies that emphasize incarceration may also serve a specific deterrence
function, influencing youths who fear future punishment not to re-offend after they are released.
Here the idea is that the experience of being in prison is sufficiently unpleasant that young
offenders will be motivated to stay out of trouble in the future. Moreover, imprisonment
prevents crime by incapacitating offenders; young criminals who are locked up can not be out on
the streets committing crimes. Finally, in theory at least, imprisonment could reduce future
crime by rehabilitating young offenders so that they will mend their criminal ways, although
rehabilitation has not been emphasized by the reformers.47
Preventive rationales for criminal punishment need not be excessively punitive, of
course. Some modern theorists accept that deterrence is the primary justification for punishing
criminals, but may disagree about what level of punishment is appropriate– on grounds of
cost-effectiveness or compatibility with other values. As we discuss in Part IV, some legal
theorists support that prevention of crime is a legitimate justification for criminal punishment,
but argue that the appropriate amount of punishment is limited by the retributive principle of
proportionality.48 But politicians in the 1980s and 1990s often seemed unconcerned with
fairness constraints, arguing that harsh punishment of juveniles was necessary to contain the
epidemic of youth crime.
B. Changing Crime Rates and the Effectiveness of Punitive Policies
Supporters of the recent reforms may point to the fact that juvenile crime has declined
substantially since the early 1990s as evidence of their success in achieving their crime-reduction
goal. On this account, youths who might be inclined to engage in criminal activity are deterred
because they now realize that real consequences will follow. Bad kids who didn't get the
46
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message are locked up (and will learn from the experience to stay out of trouble in the future).
So, to what extent does the decline in criminal activity indicate that the reform policies are
working?
Although crime rates should fall if tough sanctions in fact deter crime, criminologists
who study both adult and juvenile crime emphasize that we can not assume that changes in crime
rates are caused by changes in penal policy affecting the harshness of punishment. Historical
reviews indicate that crime rates fluctuate over time and that many factors contribute to the
variations. Criminologists agree that crime rates fell (from extraordinarily high rates) for much
of the 19th century and began to rise again in the mid-20th century. There is no agreement,
however, about what explains this trend.49 Demographics may be an important factor; some
experts have suggested that crime rates are correlated with the percentage of teens and young
men in the population at a given time.50 Others point to cultural and religious influences. James
Q. Wilson and Richard Herrnstein, for example, have argued that declining crime rates in the
19th century were a product of a period of religious revivalism and moral awakening that
affected patterns of socialization of children in families, schools and communities.51 Some
criminologists attribute the sharp rise in juvenile homicide in the late 1980s to the easy
availability of cheap guns.52 Why were teens able to get firearms so easily? The explanation may
lie partly in developments in technology and marketing and partly in the successful lobbying
efforts of the National Rifle Association.
Crime rates are statistically complex and, during any period, many factors can influence
individual decisions about getting involved in criminal activity that in the aggregate constitute
crime rates. Changes in justice policies might be important, but assertions that declining juvenile
crime rates demonstrate that punitive policies have been effective are naive– particularly in light
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of the fact that crime rates began to decline in many states before legal reforms were enacted.53
C. Does Deterrence Work? On Legal Reform and Crime Rates
Although broad claims about the causes of fluctuations in crime rates are speculative,
social scientists have produced a large body of research (mostly focusing on adults) that probes
the deterrent effects of criminal sanctions. Perceptual deterrence studies (based on self-report)
provide the most direct evidence of the impact of anticipated punishment on individuals'
decisions not to engage in criminal activity, but their reliability is uncertain and their findings are
mixed. Moreover, the extent to which expressed intentions predict behavior is unclear.54 Other
researchers focus on more indirect evidence, seeking to link changes in crime rates to particular
statutory enactments or changes in law enforcement practices, while controlling, to the extent
possible, for other factors that influence crime rates.55 These studies either examine crime rates
immediately before and after a policy reform or compare crime rates in states that have adopted
enhanced penalties with others that have not.
Experts on deterrence agree that simply having a system of law enforcement and criminal
punishment has a general deterrent effect on crime– there would be a lot more crime if there
were no criminal justice system.56 However, as Daniel Nagin, a leading expert on deterrence
research has emphasized, getting useful information about the marginal deterrent impact of
particular policy changes is an uncertain business.57 Studies of the effectiveness of specific
policies on criminal behavior have mixed findings. For example, various studies of three-strike
laws have found a crime-reduction effect in some states, but not in others, and some have found
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that criminal activity actually increased following the enactment of the enhanced penalties.58
Some studies find an initial deterrent effect of new policies (such as drunk driving laws) that
erodes over time.59
One explanation for the varied and inconsistent research findings is that many factors
contribute to effective deterrence besides the severity of sanctions. Certainty of apprehension
and punishment appears to be far more important to deterrence than severity of sanction;
potential offenders who fear they will get caught are more likely to be deterred than those who
think they will not.60 If law enforcement is ineffective or harsh sentences under the new laws are
infrequently imposed or unpredictable, potential offenders may view the risk of arrest and
punishment as low, and enhanced penalties will have little deterrent impact. Of course,
would-be criminals must also be aware of the increased sanctions in some general way for
deterrence to work. Further, the punishment must represent a substantial threat to the individual,
in terms of both loss of liberty and social stigma. If many associates are subject to the sanctions,
their deterrent effect may be diluted.61 Finally, the added cost to the actor represented by the
threat of punishment (along with other costs) must outweigh the anticipated gains of the crime.
Ultimately, deterrence theory presumes a rational decisionmaker who weighs the expected
benefits of criminal activity against the risk and perceived consequences of apprehension and
punishment. Conditions affecting this calculus may vary in different localities and among
different groups of offenders, contributing to variability in the deterrent effect of new sentencing
policies. The upshot is that we have no clear picture of how enhanced criminal sanctions,
standing alone, impact criminal activity.62
Even assuming that harsh criminal penalties generally have a deterrent effect on criminal
activity, it is uncertain whether juveniles will respond similarly to adults. Two factors that might
differentially affect the responses of youths would appear to be in tension with one another.
First, because of their psychosocial immaturity, youths may be less responsive to the impact of
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criminal penalties than adults. Developmental influences on decisionmaking that are likely
implicated in youthful decisions to get involved in crime– an inclination to take risks, a tendency
to focus on immediate rather than future consequences, susceptibility to peer influence, and
impulsivity63– in combination may also lead youths to discount or ignore the prospect of harsh
punishment. Approval by anti-social peers may be a particularly important influence that
undercuts the deterrent effect of severe sanctions. A self-report study of inner-city youths by
Wanda Foglia found that the threat of legal sanctions had little impact on delinquent behavior
but that peer behavior had a powerful impact, both through concern about social sanctions and
through internalized norms.64
Although the psychosocial immaturity of adolescents may undercut the deterrent impact
of severe sanctions, the breadth of the changes in the juvenile justice regime over the past
generation may influence modern juveniles to consider the prospect of punishment in ways that
delinquents in earlier generations did not. If youths thought they were insulated from criminal
liability because of their juvenile status under the traditional regime, they now may be more
likely to perceive that this is not so. As we have suggested, the existence of a justice system that
punishes crimes has a general deterrent effect, even if the marginal deterrent effect of particular
polices is uncertain. The rhetoric of rehabilitation surrounding the traditional juvenile court may
have led youths to perceive a world that was effectively without legal accountability, a
perception that the punitive reforms may well have altered.
A small number of studies have sought to gauge the deterrent effect of legislative waiver
statutes lowering the age of criminal court jurisdiction in different states— with mixed results.65
Simon Singer and his colleagues studied the impact of New York's statute categorically lowering
the age of criminal court jurisdiction and found no effect on juvenile crime rates over a 10 year
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period.66 A study that compared Idaho, a state that adopted a legislative waiver statute, with
Montana and Wyoming, that did not, found that crime rates rose in Idaho and declined in the
neighboring states.67 However, Stephen Levitt examined juvenile crime rates over a 15 year
period from 1978 to 1992, analyzing crime rate changes when juveniles reach the age at which
they become subject to criminal court jurisdiction. Levitt found that in states with lenient
juvenile systems, rates for violent crime declined sharply at the jurisdictional age when youths
faced adult sanctions, while crime rates rose when youths attained adult legal status in states
with strict juvenile systems and more lenient adult regimes. Levitt concluded that the threat of
harsh punishment has a substantial deterrent effect and that much of the increase in juvenile
crime in the late 1980s and early 1990s can be attributed to lenient juvenile sanctions.68
Levitt's study is the most comprehensive effort to link changes in juvenile crime rates
with severity of sanctions in several jurisdictions. His finding that crime rates decline when
youths move from a very lenient juvenile justice system into the adult system is not surprising; it
is consistent with our suggestion that youths who perceive that they are insulated from criminal
liability in the juvenile system may be deterred when they confront a regime of tough sanctions
or, put differently, with the general view that the existence of a criminal justice system has some
deterrent effect. The finding that crime rates increase rather dramatically when youths move
from a tough juvenile system to a lenient adult system is far more puzzling. We are unfamiliar
with states in which criminal court sanctions systematically are more lenient than juvenile court
dispositions and Levitt does not identify which states he classifies in this way.69
In sum, the research on the general deterrent effect of legal regulation on juvenile crime
is sparse and gives no clear answer to the question of whether legislative waiver laws and other
punitive measures reduce juvenile crime. The evidence that the reforms have contributed to the
66
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decline in crime rates is weak. Although Levitt offers some indirect support for the idea that the
transformation of youth crime policy has had a deterrent impact, most other researchers have not
found support for the conclusion that particular punitive laws deter youths from engaging in
criminal conduct.
D. Specific Deterrence– Do Punitive Laws Reduce Recidivism?
Some researchers have sought to measure the specific deterrent effect of the punitive
reforms on juvenile crime by examining whether criminal prosecution and punishment reduces
recidivism. Given that the recent legal changes have altered dramatically the risks facing youths
who get involved in crime, it would be useful to know whether youths who experience harsh
punishment then alter their future behavior. These offenders know about the risk of punitive
sanctions and they know that they may be caught and punished. Are they more likely to desist
from criminal activity than those who are dealt with more leniently? The answer should be "yes"
according to deterrence theory– and advocates for adult punishment.
Research based on interviews of young offenders indicates that being tried in criminal
court causes some youths to understand for the first time that their criminal conduct had serious
consequences.70 As a youth in one study explained, "When you're a boy, you can be put into a
detention home. But you can go to jail now. Jail ain't no place to go."71 However, it is not clear
whether or to what extent actual involvement in crime is affected by this awareness. Another
study found that youths interviewed upon release from prison reported intentions not to get
involved in crime again, but that follow-up analysis of recidivism rates suggested that they had
not adhered to their plans.72 Moreover, some researchers have found that youths in prison are
less likely to forswear future criminal activity than their counterparts in juvenile facilities.73
Lawrence Sherman and others have argued that juveniles who are punished as adults become
defiant at the perceived injustice of the severe sanctions they receive and reject the system as
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illegitimate.74 In short, it is not clear whether youths who are tried and punished as adults learn
the lessons that policy makers aim to teach in a way that deters their anti-social conduct.
Another method of evaluating the specific deterrence effect of adult sanctions is to
compare recidivism rates of youths prosecuted and punished in the adult system with those who
are sanctioned as juveniles. Most studies undertaking this comparison have found higher
recidivism rates among juveniles tried and punished as adults. However, these studies often are
seriously flawed by selection bias in that the two groups of youths differed in other ways that
may have affected recidivism. For example, transferred youths may have been involved in more
serious criminal activity or had more serious criminal records, and thus have been more likely to
recidivate ex ante.75 In other studies, differences in the length of the incarceration period make
comparison difficult.76 But two studies in the 1990s tried with more success to control for these
differences. One group of researchers led by Donna Bishop and Charles Frazier compared a
group of 2700 Florida youths transferred to criminal court, mostly based on prosecutor's
discretionary authority under Florida's direct-file statute with a carefully matched group of
youths retained in the juvenile system.77 In another study, Jeffrey Fagan and his colleagues
compared 15 and 16 year old youths charged with robbery and burglary in several counties in
metropolitan New York and in demographically similar counties in New Jersey.78 The legal
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settings differed in that New York juveniles who are charged with robbery and burglary are
automatically dealt with in the adult system at age 15 under that state's legislative waiver statute,
while in New Jersey, transfer is rarely used and the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over almost
all youths charged with these crimes.
Fagan found that youths convicted of robbery in criminal court were re-arrested and
incarcerated at a higher rate than those who were dealt with in the juvenile system, but that rates
were comparable for burglary, a less serious crime. The risk of re-arrest within 3 years of "street
time" was 29% lower for the New Jersey youths convicted of robbery in juvenile court than for
the New York juveniles who were dealt with in the criminal system. The study also examined
the number of days until re-arrest and found a similar pattern; the youths sentenced for robbery
in criminal court re-offended sooner than their juvenile court counterparts (457 days after first
release for the criminal court offenders versus 553 days for juvenile court offenders.) There was
no difference between the two groups convicted of burglary. Recidivism was not affected by
sentence length; longer sentences were not more effective at deterring recidivism than shorter
sentences. The upshot is that youths convicted of robbery who were punished as adults were
more likely to recidivate than youths who were dealt with in the juvenile system.79
The Florida study also suggests that juvenile sanctions may reduce recidivism more
effectively than criminal punishment. This study measured only re-arrest rates and found lower
rates for youths who were retained in juvenile court than youths who were transferred. The
follow-up period in this study was relatively brief– less than two years.80 During this period,
29% of the transferred youths were rearrested as compared to 19% of the youths in the juvenile
system. The researchers also calculated yearly re-arrest rates, which was .54 offenses per year
for the transferred group versus .32 for the retained youths. Transferred youths who were
rearrested were apprehended sooner after their release than juvenile system youths– 135 days
after release versus 227 days. Youths who were incarcerated in the adult system received longer
sentences; the mean number of days served was 245 versus 90 days served by those who were
incarcerated in the juvenile system. As in the New York-New Jersey study, longer sentences did
not have a deterrent effect.
The studies finding that adult punishment may contribute to recidivism in young
offenders charged with violent crimes seem to undercut the claimed crime-reduction benefits of
79
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the recent reforms. The findings should be viewed with caution however. In both studies, the two
groups of offenders (or the two settings in Fagan's study) may differ from one another in subtle
ways other than in the sanction the youths received. These researchers have mitigated this
problem far better than earlier studies; Fagan by comparing two jurisdictions that dealt with the
same offenses differently and Bishop and Frazier by matching each youth with a counterpart on
several variables, including criminal charges, number of prior referrals, and most serious prior
offense. Nonetheless, it is possible that, in Florida, prosecutors used other more subtle
distinctions as a basis of filing charges in criminal court such that more antisocial youths were
dealt with in the adult system. Moreover, as the researchers concede, the police may have
monitored youths who had been in the criminal system more closely than others, resulting in a
higher re-arrest rate. In Fagan' s study, New York prosecutors have charging discretion that may
have affected the composition of the study cohort. For example, 15 year old youths who seemed
less culpable may have been charged with lesser crimes than robbery, so that they would not be
prosecuted as adults. Thus, the cohort of young robbers in that state may be more serious
offenders than in New Jersey, where almost all youths are retained in the juvenile system, giving
prosecutors little reason to discriminate in their charging decisions.81 Moreover, law
enforcement may be more aggressive and effective in New York than in New Jersey, leading to
higher re-arrest rates in the former jurisdiction.
Given these limitations, it is fair to ask whether these studies are helpful in determining
whether young offenders subject to tough sanctions are more or less likely to offend in the
future. But, at a minimum, this research provides no support for the contention that criminal
punishment will effectively reduce recidivism. Indeed, almost all of the rather sparse empirical
evidence points to the conclusion that it does not have this effect. Absent randomized
experiments, in which offenders convicted of the same crimes are randomly assigned to either
adult or juvenile sanctions (experiments that few, if any, jurisdictions would permit),
non-experimental evidence from studies like those of Fagan and Bishop and Frazier provide the
best available evidence, and they do not support sanctioning juveniles as adults. Ultimately, the
advocates of punitive policies have very little empirical evidence to support their claims about
the benefits of tough policies.

E. Lowering Juvenile Crime Rates Through Incapacitation
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Youths who are inclined to commit crimes are constrained from doing so if they are
incarcerated. Thus, although it is unclear whether harsh sanctions generally deter youths from
criminal activity or reduce recidivism, imprisonment certainly can reduce crime through
incapacitation.82 Supporters of the recent reforms may point to this reality as powerful evidence
that tough sanctions indeed can reduce crime– despite the lack of evidence that young criminals
are deterred. The unassailable logic is that the more time young criminals spend in prison, the
less time they are on the street getting in trouble.
Although this prescription is logical, it is problematic as social policy. Incapacitation is
effective (in the short term at least), but it is very costly as a means of preventing crime.
Deterrence operates by influencing the choices of potential offenders, and thus, if it is effective,
the overall economic and social cost of crime should be reduced; fewer prison cells are needed,
fewer victims are created and youths live their lives in more socially (and personally) beneficial
ways. In contrast, as we have seen, confinement of youths for long periods in correctional
facilities carries a high economic cost and other social costs as well– particularly if the specific
deterrent effect is weak or incarceration itself contributes to re-offending.
There’s another important consideration to be weighed. Almost all incarcerated youths
will be released at some point to rejoin society; thus the impact of incarceration on re-offending
and generally on offenders’ future lives must be considered in calculating its costs and benefits.
For some youths, the risk of recidivism is high at the outset (based on prior record, for example),
and, if they have caused serious harm through their criminal activity, the costs of extensive
incapacitation may be justified on social welfare grounds. But many youths are not in this
category, and, as lawmakers expand the category of young offenders who are subject to harsh
sanctions to include moderate-risk offenders, the marginal benefits of incapacitation decline. At
some point, the cost of sanctions involving long periods of incarceration will exceed the benefits,
particularly if these costs include increasing the risk of reoffending in the future.
F. Summary
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The research that we have reviewed provides no clear answer to the question of how
much the criminalization of juvenile justice policy has contributed to the declining crime rate of
the past decade. Our review leads us to conclude that the punitive reforms likely have had some
effect, at least in the short term, through increased incapacitation (both in the adult and juvenile
systems) and possibly through general deterrence as well. Theory and research on adults support
the view that a justice regime that signals to youths that they will be held accountable for their
misdeeds may deter crime more effectively than one in which they think their status as juveniles
shields them from punishment.83 It is not at all clear, however, whether the legal changes of the
past generation are optimal or excessive as the means of bringing about changed perceptions. A
juvenile system grounded in accountability and certainty of sanction may shape perceptions in
ways that influence behavior as effectively as the current regime with a more modest budgetary
impact and fewer collateral costs.
Beyond this, the evidence does not support the claims by supporters of the punitive
reforms that juveniles will be deterred by tough sanctions or that the reforms are responsible for
the decline in juvenile crime rates that began in the mid-1990s. In many states, such as
California, juvenile crime rates had been steadily declining for several years before legislatures
enacted tough reforms.84 Moreover, although the research findings are mixed, most studies find
no evidence that the enactment of automatic transfer laws has discouraged youths generally from
getting involved in crime. Somewhat more surprisingly, perhaps, the research does not indicate
that those young offenders who are sentenced to prison for violent offenses are less likely to
offend upon release by virtue of that experience; indeed, the studies that exist suggest that they
have higher recidivism rates than their counterparts in the juvenile system and that sentence
severity does not appear to affect recidivism. In short, the argument that public safety will be
promoted if youths get “adult time for adult crime” has little empirical support. Given that this
claim is at the heart of the preventive argument for harsh sanctions, the case for get-tough
policies is far weaker than its supporters acknowledge.

III. Adolescent Development and Optimal Justice System Interventions
The dearth of evidence supporting the effectiveness of tough sanctions in deterring
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youthful criminal activity becomes less puzzling when we consider the responses of young
offenders in light of the scientific knowledge about adolescence. First, as we have suggested, due
to their psychosocial immaturity, teens on the street deciding whether to hold up a convenience
store may simply be less capable than adults of considering the sanctions they will face. Thus,
the developmental influences on decisionmaking that likely shape their decisions to get involved
in criminal activity may also make adolescents less responsive to the threat of criminal
sanctions.85 Beyond this, however, sanctions themselves may vary in their impact on the future
developmental trajectories of adolescents in ways that are important to recidivism. The research
supports the conclusion that prison provides an aversive social context that inhibits youths from
accomplishing developmental tasks of adolescence essential to the transition to non-criminal
adulthood. In contrast, the juvenile system potentially can do a better job of responding to
developmental needs. Although long incarceration in any institutional setting (adult or juvenile)
is unlikely to have a beneficial impact on development, many juvenile facilities and community
programs offer youths developmental settings that can facilitate healthy maturation. In general,
scientific knowledge about adolescence reinforces the lesson that a legal regime that aims to
reduce recidivism will deal with most young offenders in the juvenile system.
In this Part, we first explore lessons from developmental psychology and criminology
that have important implications for correctional policy in a regime that aims to reduce crime.
Then in light of this knowledge, we examine adult prisons and juvenile programs as contexts for
development. Finally we ask the question, “What characterizes the programs that are effective in
reducing crime in young offenders?” The evidence is clear that programs that are grounded in
developmental science have superior outcomes, and that they offer good value for society’s
investment in crime reduction.
A. Lessons from Developmental Research
The developmental research offers two lessons that together underscore the importance of
correctional interventions in shaping the trajectories of young offenders’ lives. First, many
adolescents engage in criminal activity, but a relatively small percentage of these are inclined to
become career criminals. Developmentalists explain that risky experimentaion is a part of
identity formation for many teens. Thus, psychologist Terrie Moffitt has observed, for adolescent
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boys, getting involved in criminal activity is “a normal part of teenage life.”86 But most youths
mature out of their criminal tendencies; only about five percent are incipient career criminals.87
Criminologists find that the crime rate peaks at age 17 and then declines steeply.88 The upshot is
that much adolescent criminal activity is “normative” behavior as psychologists use this term,
and not indicative of bad character or criminal predisposition. In responding to criminal conduct
of juveniles, society has an important interest in facilitating their transition to non-criminal
adulthood.
The second lesson of developmental science is just as important to achieving the goal of
reducing the social cost of juvenile crime. Mid- and late adolescence is a period in which
individuals normally make substantial progress in acquiring and coordinating skills in several
areas that are essential to functioning in the conventional roles that are part of self-sufficient
adulthood. First, individuals begin to acquire basic educational and vocational skills to enable
them to function in the workplace as productive members of society. They also acquire the social
skills necessary to establish stable intimate relationships and to cooperate in groups. Finally they
must begin to learn to behave responsibly without external supervision and set meaningful
personal goals for themselves. For most individuals, the process of completing these
developmental tasks extends into early adulthood, but making substantial progress in
adolescence is important.
This process of development toward psychosocial maturity is one of reciprocal
interaction between the individual and her social context. Healthy social contexts provide
"opportunity structures" that facilitate normative development, but social contexts can also
undermine this process.89 Several environmental conditions are particularly important– the
presence or absence of an authoritative adult parent figure; association with prosocial or
antisocial peers; and participation (or not) in educational, extracurriular or employment activities
that facilitate the development of autonomous decision-making and critical thinking skills. For
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the youth in the justice system, the correctional setting becomes the environment for social
development and may affect whether he makes the transition to conventional adult roles
successfully.90
Normative teens who get involved in crime do so, in part, because their choices are
driven by developmental influences typical of adolescence. In theory, they should desist from
criminal behavior and mature into reasonably responsible adults as they attain psycho-social
maturity. We have indirect evidence that many young offenders follow this process as predicted;
the crime rate drops off sharply in late adolescence, and the research shows that desistance is
often linked to achieving stable employment or a satisfying marriage.91 Whether youths
successfully make the transition to conventional adult roles, however, depends in part on
whether their social context provides opportunity structures for successfully completing the
developmental tasks described above.92
The correctional environment may influence the developmental trajectories of normative
adolescents in the justice system in important ways. Factors such as the attitudes and roles of
adult supervisors, the identity and behavior of other offenders, and the availability (or lack)of
good educational, skill building and rehabilitative programs shape the social context of youths in
the adult and juvenile system. These social influences may affect the inclination of young
offenders to desist or persist in their criminal activities. The correctional context may also
facilitate or impede their development into adults who can function adequately in society– in the
workplace, in marriage or other intimate unions, and as citizens.
B. Prisons as Developmental Settings
In most states, youths in prison are dealt with like other inmates, receiving few (or no)
special accommodations or programs in recognition of their developmental needs. Many features
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of the typical prison make it a harmful environment for adolescent offenders.93 First,
prisons are generally much larger institutions than juvenile facilities. According to one estimate,
more than 40% of prisons house more than 500 prisoners; many have an inmate population of
more than 1000.94 Even the largest training schools house on average about 125 youths, and
other residential programs are far smaller.95 Institutional size affects the experience of inmates
in several ways. In large institutions, violence levels are higher, staff-inmate relationships are
more impersonal and the organizational structure is more rigid.96 Researchers have found that
recidivism rates among juvenile offenders increase with the size of the institution.97
The function of prison is to punish and confine criminals and that purpose is reflected in
the organization and staffing. More than two-thirds of prison employees are uniformed guards
and other security staff whose job is to maintain order and security by monitoring inmates.
Although some educational and counseling programs may be provided, these services are not
readily available and are often add-ons– provided by adjunct staff and not integrated into prison
life. Some states provide special instructional programs in prison for minors, but this is by no
means the norm, and young prisoners have no right to educational services comparable to those
offered non-institutionalized youths.98 One study reported that the teacher-to-student ratio in
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prison was 1:100, and that fewer than 40% of inmates received any academic instruction.99
Counseling, therapeutic and occupational training staff generally are scarce in prison; fewer than
10% of prisoners in one study were involved in any kind of counseling program.100
These dimensions of prison organization shape the experience of youths incarcerated in
the adult system in ways that are likely to undermine healthy psycho-social development. First,
adult authority figures are unlikely to have a positive influence. Researchers report that
correctional officers, whose job is to maintain security, have impersonal, authoritarian and often
hostile relationship with inmates. Not surprisingly, young prisoners, in turn, express hostility
toward staff, who are perceived as being unconcerned about inmates' welfare and uninterested in
helping young inmates to develop social skills, improve relationships or deal with problems.101
Further, with little in the way of education, occupational training or rehabilitation, many prisons
provide minimal positive structure for inmates' daily lives. In these facilities, much time is spent
in cells or in the prison yard with other prisoners, under the surveillance of guards on the
perimeter.102
Frequent opportunities for interaction among prisoners together with distant relationships
with staff combine to create an aversive developmental context. Although youths are separated
from adults in some prisons, this is not the case in most facilities.103 According to reports by
young prisoners, experienced criminals teach them strategies and methods for engaging in
criminal activity and avoiding detection.104 Young inmates are also more likely to be victimized
than older prisoners or than their counterparts in juvenile facilities; ten times as many youths in
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prison report sexual assaults as youths in juvenile facilities.105 In some facilities, young
prisoners who are targets of older predators are isolated for their own protection, apparently
because isolating victims is easier than restraining attackers.106 Most prisoners decline to report
victimization to prison officials; to do so is a serious violation of prison norms against snitching
and may only increase vulnerability to attack. Young prisoners often attempt to protect
themselves from victimization by responding aggressively to threats, which can result in
disciplinary sanctions.107
In general, juvenile inmates engage in more misconduct and are subject to administrative
segregation and disciplinary sanctions (such as exclusion from work assignments, programs, and
good-time credits) far more often than older prisoners. To some extent, the aggressive
misconduct of young inmates probably reflects the reality that some youths in prison are tough
antisocial individuals. However, developmental influences may also be a factor. Being more
sensitive to peer approval than are adults, adolescents may engage in aggressive conduct to
prove their toughness and masculinity and thereby attain higher peer status.108
The upshot is that the experience of imprisonment is more aversive for adolescents than
for older prisoners. Unlike adults, adolescents are in a formative developmental stage that
powerfully influences the future trajectory of their lives. Prisons provide barren and hostile
environments for developing essential capacities and skills that are necessary for making the
transition to conventional adult roles. In most facilities, little effort is made to prepare youths to
function in the workplace as adults or to develop the interpersonal skills necessary to establish
stable intimate relationships. Prisons also function as apprentice programs for professional
careers in crime. The available adult authority figures are guards who are distant and hostile,
and many adult prisoners either threaten young prisoners or influence them to become more
proficient criminals.
Moreover, the harmful effects of imprisonment follow young offenders after they are
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released in ways that amplify its negative impact on psycho-social development. A felony
conviction is a stigmatic signal that carries legal disabilities such as disenfranchisement and
exclusion from military service (which has been found to be another pathway to desistance for
young offenders109). Just as important are the informal handicaps that undermine the ability of
young felons to move into conventional adult roles. Disclosure of a criminal record is mandatory
in many settings and often the criminal conviction will bar educational opportunities and
meaningful employment. Further, a youth who has been in prison may find it much harder to
develop social relationships with peers who are not involved in crime. Thus, youths who serve
time in prison are severely handicapped in their efforts to find meaningful legal employment or
to establish a stable intimate relationship or marriage, the two most important factors associated
with desistance from involvement in crime.
C. Juvenile Facilities as Developmental Settings
Juvenile facilities are far from optimal as settings for healthy adolescent development
under the best conditions, and many institutions for young offenders are almost indistinguishable
from prisons. Some facilities, however, provide young offenders with programs, supervision, and
supportive correctional environments that, in combination, are less likely to harm their prospects
for becoming productive adults– and, at their best, may contribute positively to the transition
from antisocial adolescent to normative adult. In other words, prisons and juvenile facilities tend
to differ in several ways that may be important to their developmental impact on confined
youths. These differences may shed light on the question of why youths who are imprisoned do
not appear to be more effectively deterred than youths in the juvenile system despite the aversive
nature of the prison experience.
Although the regulation of youth crime has become harsher over the past generation,
juvenile facilities and programs in many states continue to recognize that convicted youths are
adolescents with developmental needs. Thus, juvenile facilities tend to offer environments that
are less purely custodial than typical prisons. In many juvenile facilities, a relatively large
number of line staff perform educational and counseling duties. Ninety five per cent of training
schools have a ratio of at least one teacher per fifteen youths and two-thirds have one counselor
for every ten youths.110 Even in states that have enthusiastically embraced punitive reforms, the
programs and organization of juvenile facilities often is based on a developmental therapeutic
model. For example, in Florida, which transfers many youths and imposes harsh sentences on
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juveniles,111 juvenile correctional programs are based on empirically-validated cognitive
behavioral principles that guide staff behavior and staff-resident interaction.112 Residents' daily
schedules include academic classes, skills training, counseling and recreational activities.113
There is some evidence that these distinctive programmatic aspects of the juvenile system
affect the social environment of youths in ways that contribute positively to psychological
development. Self-report studies find that youths in juvenile facilities have far more positive
attitudes about staff than do young prisoners in the adult system. In general, the former group
report that staff are concerned about their welfare, encourage them to participate in programs,
and attempt to help them develop social skills and solve problems.114 Offenders in juvenile
facilities are also more likely than youths in prison to say that they intend to avoid criminal
activity in the future. When asked to evaluate programs, youths reported benefitting the most
from long term intensive programs in which they developed relationships with caring counselors,
particularly programs that were directed at improving social skills and self control.115 In effect,
these youths reported that staff in their facilities provided social conditions and experiences that
research indicates facilitate the attainment of psycho-social competence. As we will see shortly,
the characteristics of programs that youths found most helpful are those that researchers have
correlated with reduced recidivism.116
D. Youths in Community-Based Programs
Even under contemporary law, a large percentage of youths serve all or part of their
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delinquency dispositions in their communities, rather than in correctional facilities.117 For many
offenders, community sanctions may be optimal– lower in cost than confinement in a
correctional facility and offering a better context for navigating the transition to productive
adulthood. Many normative adolescents will be better off if they are not removed from their
families, schools and communities. For non-delinquent youths, these social environments
provide the opportunity structures for completing the developmental tasks that are the basis of
psychosocial maturity. Residential facilities, even those that are organized to respond to
adolescents' developmental needs, are generally not ideal settings for acquiring the skills
necessary to make a successful transition to adulthood, particularly if youths are confined for
long periods. Delinquent youths will ultimately return to the community and must be able to
function in the social contexts that constitute their world.
An obvious problem with community sanctions for many delinquent youths is that their
families, peer groups, neighborhoods and\or schools may undermine rather than support healthy
psycho-social development. Criminologists explain that toxic social contexts contribute to
youthful offending.118 Unless something changes in the setting or in young offenders ability to
avoid negative influences, they are likely to continue their involvement in criminal activity.
Youths whose friends are involved in crime, whose parents are deficient, and whose schools are
dangerous settings that lack resources may find it hard to stay in the community and not get into
criminal activity again. Thus, an important goal of any community-based disposition is to
minimize the impact of negative social contexts by providing delinquent youths with tools to
deal in self-protective ways with their social environment, and also to facilitate and reinforce
settings that promote healthy development.119 As we will see shortly, these strategies
characterize programs that are successful at reducing recidivism.
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The goal of changing the interaction between the youth and his social environment is also
important for the offender who returns to his community after a period of incarceration. A
"reentry" period of structured supervision and support can enhance the youth's ability to function
in his community in ways that minimize the likelihood that he will simply reconnect with
anti-social peers and resume his involvement in criminal activity. The developmental benefits of
programs in correctional facilities can be lost when youths return to their communities and
neighborhoods, unless they receive support during the transition. Recent research indicates that
youths who have been released from institutional placement are more likely to re-offend when
they return to environments characterized by bad parenting and, especially, the presence of
antisocial peers.120 Increasingly, effective correctional programs include intensive community
probation to assure that interventions have a lasting impact.
Community sanctions grounded in developmental knowledge are quite different from
those employed by the traditional juvenile court, where loosely supervised probation was a
standard disposition for less serious and first-time offenders. If offenders who are subject to
community sanctions are not carefully supervised and if the criminogenic influences in their
social environment are not addressed, many will not desist from criminal activity. Moreover, an
important lesson of the deterrence research is that young offenders must understand that they
will be punished for the harms they cause. The traditional courts, in meting out community
probation (and little else) to many young offenders, failed to communicate this message and
apparently achieved little deterrence. Some localities have found that sanctions that include not
only therapeutic and skill-building programs, but also compensation to victims, community
service, close supervision and enforcement of probation conditions such as curfews and orders to
avoid anti-social peers are more effective in promoting accountability and reducing recidivism.121
Supporters of harsh sanctions are suspicious of community-based programs, in part because they
assume that public protection requires incarceration of many young offenders. Whether this is
true depends in part on the effectiveness of community-based programs in reducing recidivism .
While traditional probation has not been successful at achieving this goal, developmental
knowledge suggests that interventions that alter criminogenic social contexts and provide youths
with developmental tools that can assist them to attain psychosocial maturity may be more
effective. If community interventions are effective in reducing re-offending with youths who
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otherwise would be confined, they may be superior on public welfare grounds, given that they
are less costly financially and less disruptive to young offenders' lives. We turn next to the
empirical evidence, which indicates that some community based programs indeed are effective at
reducing crime.
E. What Works with Young Offenders?
The evidence we have presented thus far generally supports a policy of retaining most
young offenders in the juvenile system as more likely to promote public welfare than the
contemporary approach of punishing many youths as adults. But juvenile correctional facilities
and programs vary greatly. Some youths are incarcerated in prison-like training schools, while
others receive loosely supervised probation– neither of which are likely to be effective at
changing antisocial behavior. An important question therefore is what the juvenile system can
offer young offenders that will be effective at reducing recidivism.
Until the 1990s, most researchers who study juvenile delinquency programs might well
have answered that the system had little to offer in the way of effective therapeutic interventions;
the dominant view of social scientists in the 1970s and 80s was that "nothing works" to reduce
recidivism with young offenders.122 Today the picture is considerably brighter, in large part due
to a substantial body of research produced over the past 15 years showing that many juvenile
programs, both in the community and in institutional settings, have a substantial crime-reduction
effect; for the most promising programs, that effect is in the range of 20% to 30%.123 Moreover,
by applying meta-analysis, a relatively new quantitative method for coding, analyzing, and
accurately comparing the findings of many related studies, researchers are able to sort the types
of interventions that are promising from those that are ineffective and to clarify the attributes of
effective programs.124 An increased focus on research-based programs and on careful outcome
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evaluation allows policymakers to assess accurately the impact on recidivism rates of particular
programs to determine whether the economic costs are justified. In a real sense, these
developments have revived rehabilitation as a realistic goal of juvenile justice interventions.
In general, successful programs are those that attend to the lessons of developmental
psychology, seeking to provide young offenders with supportive social contexts and to assist
them in acquiring the skills necessary to change problem behavior and attain psycho-social
maturity. In his comprehensive meta-analysis of 400 juvenile programs, Mark Lipsey found that
among the most effective programs in both community and institutional settings were those that
focused on improving social development skills– in the areas of interpersonal relations, self
control, academic performance and job skills.125 Some effective programs focus directly on
developing skills to avoid anti-social behavior, often through cognitive behavioral therapy, a
therapeutic approach with substantial empirical support.126 For example, Aggression
Replacement Training is a cognitive-behavioral intervention that focuses on anger control,
pro-social skill development and moral reasoning. Other interventions that have been shown to
have a positive effect on crime reduction focus on strengthening family support. In Functional
Family Therapy, for example, therapists work in youths' homes to improve emotional
connections between parents and children and strengthen parents' abilities to provide structure
and limits for their children. This approach explicitly recognizes the importance of authoritative
parenting for healthy development, as does Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care, an
intervention that has been found to be quite effective with high-risk and chronic offenders. This
program places youths with trained and supervised foster parents for 6 to 12 months, while they
also engage in family therapy with their own parents. This program involves close supervision
and treatment in the home, school and community, adult mentoring, and separation from
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delinquent peers.127
One of the most successful interventions with violent and aggressive youths is
multi-systemic therapy (MST), a community-based program that has been replicated and
evaluated repeatedly for almost 20 years with many groups of juvenile offenders. MST is
thoroughly grounded in developmental knowledge, combining cognitive behavioral therapy with
an ecological approach that deals with individual youths in the multiple social contexts in which
they live– their families, peer groups, schools and communities, addressing the factors that
contribute to criminal conduct across these settings. MST therapists work in teams with small
caseloads of four to six families, providing intensive in-home services. The focus of treatment is
to empower parents with skills and resources to support their children in avoiding problem
behaviors and to give youths the tools to cope with family, peer and school problems that can
contribute to reinvolvement in criminal activity.128 Controlled studies of MST have shown it to
be among the most effective justice system treatments. One study compared chronic and violent
offenders receiving MST with a randomly assigned group who received the standard treatment of
supervised probation, and found that MST reduced rates of both re-offending and incarceration
in this group of very high risk offenders. The MST youths had significantly lower recidivism
rates over a 59 week period despite the fact that they remained in the community an average of
73 days more than youths in the control group during that period.129 Moreover, a two year
follow-up study showed that youths who received MST continued to re-offend at a substantially
lower rate than those who got standard dispositional treatment (although the rates for both
groups were relatively high).130
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Not all juvenile programs are effective at reducing crime. Two popular programs –
military boot camps and "scared straight" programs, in which youths are taken to adult prisons
and lectured on the perils they face if they persist in their criminal ways, actually increase
recidivism; young offenders who participate in these programs commit more crimes than other
youths.131 Moreover, even effective programs can fail if they are not well implemented. Some
studies have found substantial variations in recidivism rates due to differences in the quality of
staff and compliance with program protocols.132 This suggests that general replication in the
justice system of effective "model programs" may sometimes not produce the positive results
that program developers achieve. Beyond this, duration of the treatment and amount of contact
time are often positively correlated with effectiveness. Lipsey' s meta-analysis found that those
programs that exceeded the mean in these dimensions were more effective at reducing recidivism
than briefer programs that involved less contact.133
Many treatment programs in the justice system are more expensive than standard
probation or parole, the alternative to which they often are compared. MST, for example, costs
approximately $5000 per youth.134 How can policymakers decide whether the benefits of
particular programs justify their cost to taxpayers? Recently state govermnents have begun to
focus on the cost effectiveness of criminal and juvenile sanctions, and have enlisted economists
to calculate whether the benefits of various programs, as measured by the value to taxpayers and
crime victims of the programs' expected effect on crime, is greater than their costs. A
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of 400 programs aimed at crime reduction found that
several of the juvenile justice programs we have described offered taxpayers the best return for
dollars invested— better than programs aimed at adult criminals and better than early childhood
and school prevention programs (although the latter have other goals besides crime
prevention).135 For example, based on research showing that MST reduces recidivism by about
30%, taxpayers gain about $31,000 in subsequent criminal justice system savings for each
program participant– or more than $6 for each dollar spent. When the value to potential crime
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victims is included, the benefit rises to $131,918, or $28 for each dollar spent.136 The cost-benefit
ratio for Functional Family Therapy, Aggression Replacement Training and Multidimensional
Treatment Foster Care were also very favorable.137 The upshot is that a range of intensive
programs in the juvenile system have proved effective if they are faithfully and competently
implemented with appropriately targeted youths. These programs offer good value for taxpayers'
dollars spent and the benefits in terms of crime reduction far exceed the costs.
This promising research on juvenile justice programs challenges the claim that punitive
policies promote social welfare by reducing youth crime. Cost-conscious policymakers who care
about reducing crime would be well advised to invest in these research-based programs as a key
element in the legal response to juvenile crime. The fact that some of the most cost-effective
interventions are community-based programs suggests that community sanctions can play an
important role in a contemporary regime that is quite different from that of probation and parole
in the traditional system. This not to say, however, that all young offenders should remain in the
community. Even though some programs such as MST have been shown to reduce recidivism
even in serious and chronic offenders, there may be good reasons to place in residential facilities
some youths who commit serious violent crimes or who are repeat offenders. Very few studies of
justice system programs to date have compared community-based sanctions with incarceration,
and thus the impact of incapacitation periods on crime rates has rarely been included in the
calculus. Some youths simply present too much of a risk to public safety to stay in the
community. Moreover, the threat of incarceration may have an impact on general deterrence that
would be diluted in a regime that seldom uses confinement as a sanction. However, community
sanctions are appropriate for many youths, and others can benefit from community-based
interventions as part of the transition from residential programs. Extensive use of programs that
have demonstrated effectiveness is a good investment for a state aiming to advance social
welfare through its juvenile justice policies.
The developmental and programmatic research we have described provides a key
rationale for maintaining a system of juvenile justice separate from the adult system. The
question of whether maintaining a separate system for juveniles is important or desirable has
been the subject of policy debate in recent years, with conservatives and even some progressive
136
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academics arguing for dismantling the juvenile system. For example, Barry Feld has argued for a
unitary system in which juveniles would serve shorter sentences for their crimes in recognition
of their reduced culpability and also be housed separately from adult inmates.138 Such a regime
would satisfy the requirements of fair punishment. But a key lesson of the research we have
reviewed is that a regime that aims to reduce crime will treat most juvenile offenders differently
from their adult counterparts; even youths who must be incarcerated for public safety reasons
should be confined in facilities that provide a social context, programs and services very
different from adult prisons. A separate juvenile system is far more likely than a unitary system
to create a developmentally appropriate social environment and provide research-based
interventions– and generally, to recognize that differential treatment of adolescent offenders is
the key to crime reduction.
*
To this point, we have examined youth crime policy through a consequentialist lens, a
perspective from which the primary policy goal is to promote social welfare, and particularly to
prevent future crime. Many supporters of punitive policies argue that achieving this goal requires
the extensive use of incarceration of young offenders in both the adult and juvenile systems. We
have found little support for this claim. Indeed, most of the evidence points to the conclusion that
the social costs of criminalization outweigh the benefits. Extensive use of incarceration is
expensive; juvenile justice expenditures have risen steeply in response to policy shifts in this
direction. This cost is justified only if these policies are more effective at public protection than
less costly alternatives. But the existing research data provides little support for the notion that
tough sanctions function effectively to deter crime, either generally or in their impact on young
offenders.
The evidence that adult punishment of young offenders is likely to encourage antisocial
behavior and undermine the prospect of normative development is reinforced by developmental
knowledge about adolescence. The scientific research supports that for most adolescents, the
inclination to get involved in criminal activity is a product of developmental influences that will
diminish with maturity. Developmental research also emphasizes the importance of social
context during adolescence, and correctional programs can either promote or inhibit healthy
development depending on the social context they provide. Treatment programs in the juvenile
system that apply the lessons of developmental research have been shown to be cost-effective
means of reducing recidivism. This evidence suggests that rehabilitation, discredited as the
foundation of the traditional juvenile system, has a revitalized role to play in contemporary
138
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regime that aims to promote the welfare of society as well as that of young offenders.
IV. Retribution as a Limiting Principle in Regulating Juvenile Crime
We have shown that regulation that is grounded in scientific knowledge of adolescence is
more likely to prevent juvenile crime and reduce its social cost than an approach that ignores
differences between juveniles and adults. In this Part, we argue that the developmental model
also promotes fairness and legitimacy in juvenile justice policy. In a justice system committed to
fairness, punishment is limited to sanctions that are proportionate to the harm of the offense and
the culpability of the young offender. Developmental knowledge clarifies most youths, due to
their developmental immaturity, are less blameworthy than their adult counterparts and thus
should receive more lenient punishment.
Both crime reduction and fair punishment are important purposes of crime regulation,
and we think both are essential to a stable and satisfactory system of youth crime regulation.139
Fairness alone is an inadequate basis for formulating policy because, as we have suggested,
fairness can be accommodated within a unitary criminal justice system by giving youths
discounted sentences.140 Only if lawmakers also aim to reduce crime and promote social welfare
is it important to have a separate system that responds to the developmental needs of young
offenders. But crime prevention alone is also inadequate as a regulatory purpose. Under the
developmental model, retribution functions importantly as a limiting principle and source of
legitimacy. Commitment to fair retribution constrains the authority of the government to
intervene in the lives of young offenders as it pursues its preventive purposes by mandating that
the duration and harshness of sanctions be limited to what the offender deserves on the basis of
the offense itself.141 This constraint is necessary to prevent excessive punishment and to avoid
exacerbating sentencing disparities that already threaten the legitimacy and political stability of
the justice system. It also promotes confidence in the legal system as well as public acceptance
of criminal sanctions.142
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This part begins with a brief analysis of the culpability of adolescent offenders, which
confirms that developmental factors influence youthful criminal choices in ways that mitigate
blame under conventional criminal law principles and doctrines. We then argue that retribution,
as embodied in the proportionality principle is essential as an element of a satisfactory model of
juvenile justice, challenging the argument for a regime based on prevention alone. Finally this
part addresses the question of whether policies that promote social welfare will be compatible
with proportionality, and generally with principles of fair punishment. We conclude that
tensions exist between prevention and retribution, but can usually be reconciled.
A. Developmental Research and the Culpability of Young Offenders
In general, factors that reduce culpability under the criminal law can be grouped in three
rough categories. The first category include endogenous impairments and deficiencies in the
actor’s decisionmaking capacity that affect his choice to get involved in criminal activity. Mental
illness and retardation are in this category, as is developmental immaturity. Under the second
category, an actor may be less culpable if he engaged in the criminal conduct in response to
extraordinary coercive circumstances that a reasonable person would be unable to resist. The
third category of mitigation applies when the actor can show that the criminal act was not the
product of bad character. Each of these sources of mitigation applies to the crimes of juvenile
offenders and together support a regime that deals with most juveniles as an intermediate
category of offenders– not as adults but also not as children.143
1. Deficiencies in decisionmaking. Developmental research indicates that adolescents
differ from adults in their decisionmaking capacities in ways that affect their criminal choices,
due to both cognitive and psychosocial immaturity, but the deficiencies are more subtle than
those that characterize younger children. By age 14 or 15, most adolescents have the capacities
for reasoning and understanding comparable those of adults–when measured in laboratory
studies.144 But there is reason to believe that in unstructured real-world settings, such as those in
which decisions about criminal activity are made, teenagers do not process information as
efficiently as adults and may be more susceptible to stress and emotional arousal.145
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More importantly, perhaps, several psychosocial developmental factors influence
adolescents’ decisionmaking in ways that contribute to immature judgment. First, teenagers are
more susceptible to peer influence than are adults.146 They also differ from adults in future
orientation, being less inclined to weigh future consequences than are adults and more likely to
focus on the here and now.147 Third, adolescents differ in their assessment of and attitude toward
risk. Teens tend to value rewards more than risks and sometimes to count as a reward what an
adult would view as a risk.148 And fourth, teens tend to be more impulsive than adults, having
more difficulty regulating their moods, impulses and behavior.149
In combination, these developmental factors are likely to influence juveniles’ decisions to
get involved in criminal activity in ways that distinguish them from adult criminals and makes
their choices less culpable. Adolescent decisionmaking is not as impaired as is that of children
or persons who with severe mental disabilities, whose crimes may be excused due to their
impairments. But the deficiencies that contribute to immature judgment in teens are
developmental in nature and are characteristic of adolescents as a group. They are also organic,
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and are no more subject to individual control than are the impairments that affect the
decisionmaking of mentally ill and retarded adults.
2. Unformed Character and Culpability. A related mitigation condition that is also
important in assessing the culpability of typical young offenders involves to the relatively
unformed nature of their characters. The criminal law implicitly assumes that harmful conduct
reflects the actor’s bad character, and evidence that this is not so can be offered in mitigation of
culpability.150 The criminal conduct of most teens is grounded in developmental processes that
are constitutive of adolescence– immature judgment and normative experimentation with risky
behaviors. It does not stem from stable moral deficiencies predictive of bad character. The
character of the typical adolescent has not yet stabilized and his personal identity is in flux,151
and precisely for this reason, his criminal act, like that of the adult who establishes mitigation on
this ground, does not express his bad character.
2. Situational Coercion. A somewhat different source of mitigation in criminal law may
apply to some adolescents who, because of their social context, are subject to extraordinary
coercive pressures to become involved in criminal activity. The criminal law does not require
unusual fortitude or bravery, and mitigation may apply to crimes committed in response to
extreme external pressures that an ordinary (or “reasonable”) person would not be able to
resist.152 Ordinary adolescents who live in high-crime neighborhoods are subject to intense
social pressures and often tangible threats that induce them to join in criminal activity. In some
contexts, coercion is so intense that only unusual teens resist the pressure. Moreover, unlike
adults, adolescents as minors whose liberties are constricted due to their dependency; thus, they
are not in a position to extricate themselves from their schools or their neighborhoods.
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These circumstances are similar in kind to those that are involved in claims of duress,
provocation, necessity, or domination by co-defendants. The source of mitigation on the basis of
exogenous conditions is not purely developmental in nature, but they are a product of a
dependency, which itself is grounded in immaturity. When adolescents cross the line to legal
adulthood, the formal legal disabilities of youth are lifted. Young adults can avoid the situational
pressures they face by removing themselves from criminogenic settings. Moreover, pressure to
get involved in crime eases as normal maturation influences most individuals to move beyond
the risky activities of youth. Thus, adults have no claim of situational mitigation on the ground
that they are restricted to a social setting in which avoiding crime is difficult.153
*
The adolescent who commits a crime typically is not so deficient in her decisionmaking
capacity that she cannot understand the harmful consequences of her conduct or appreciate its
wrongfulness, as might be true of mentally disordered person or a child. Nor are the
circumstances of her social context as coercive as those that excuse defendants from criminal
liability.154 But the developmental and social factors that drive decisionmaking predictably
contribute to choices that reflect immature judgment and unformed character and are made under
social pressure. Thus youthful criminal choices have much in common with those of adults
whose criminal conduct is out of character, whose decisionmaking capacities are impaired by
emotional distress or mental illness or disability, or whose choices are were influenced by
extremely coercive circumstances. As the Supreme Court recognized in striking down the
juvenile death penalty in Roper v. Simmons in 2005, the criminal choices of adolescents deserve
less punishment than do those of adults because they are shaped by developmental immaturity
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and coercive social contexts.155 A justice system that is committed to fairness, as embodied in the
principle of proportionality, will punish adolescents less severely than adult offenders.
B. Why Retribution is Important
At one level, the conclusion that mitigation applies to the crimes of young offenders has
modest implications for justice policy. As we have indicated, a regime dedicated to fairness
could deal with juvenile and adult offenders in a unitary system and simply apply a “youth
discount” to the sentences of juvenile offenders in recognition of their reduced culpability.156
The argument for a separate juvenile justice system that implements developmentally-based
policies aimed at reducing crime is not based on fairness and is unconcerned about the
proportionality of sanctions. Therefore, given our emphasis on the social welfare value of
evidence-based policies aimed at prevention, why is retribution or fair punishment important to
the construction of optimal juvenile justice policies?
Before we explain the essential role of proportionality in a well-functioning model of
juvenile justice, we should review briefly the difference between the law’s preventive and
retributive purposes. Retribution focuses on the past criminal act which determines the amount
of deserved punishment. The goal of crime prevention, in contrast, is future-oriented. Deterrence
(specific and general), rehabilitation, and incapacitation all focus on the impact of correctional
interventions on future criminal conduct and are not concerned with calibrating that response to
the seriousness of the past criminal act or the culpability of the offender.157 Thus, an offender
who is judged to present a serious risk of re-offending may receive a longer sentence than
another whose crime is more serious, but who is deemed less dangerous. Thus, taking
proportionality seriously means not only that juveniles, due to their immaturity will be punished
more leniently than their adult counterparts; it also means that young offenders who commit
similar crimes should receive similar treatment on the basis of their crimes and culpability.
Proportionality prohibits serious disparities in the treatment of young offenders on the basis of
factors other than their criminal conduct.
Over the past century, retribution has been in and out of favor among lawmakers,
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reformers and scholars. The Progressive reformers who created the traditional juvenile court
insisted that its purpose was solely to rehabilitate young offenders and that criminal
responsibility and punishment played no role in delinquency dispositions.158 For this reason,
juvenile court dispositions were indeterminate– based on the individual offender’s treatment
needs-- and, in theory, unrelated to the seriousness of the offense. In the 1970s and 1980s,
reformers on both the left and right rejected the rehabilitative model as both ineffective and
unfair. First, youth advocates favored proportionate sentences in the juvenile system that were
shorter in duration than those imposed on adult criminals.159 This approach emphasized
accountability and fairness and rejected crime prevention as a dispositional goal.160 More
recently, alarm about public safety has resulted in a shift in emphasis toward prevention–
particularly incapacitation, although punitive reformers also emphasized full accountability.161
Juvenile advocates have also focused on crime reduction in support of evidence-based
community programs for young offenders. Recently, Professors Slobogin and Fondacaro have
highlighted the importance of these programs in arguing for a regime dedicated solely to
reducing crime and protecting the public.162
Slobogin and Fondacaro reject retribution altogether as a legitimate purpose of juvenile
justice policy; under their model, proportionality plays no role in determining correctional
dispositions. Instead, their regime aims solely at specific deterrence; dispositions are determined
on the basis of risk assessment, which they assert can be performed with substantial accuracy.163
Slobogin and Fondacaro argue that evidence-based community programs are the most effective
means of reducing juvenile crime, and apparently assume that most delinquency dispositions will
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take this form.164 But they concede that some youths who pose a risk to public safety must be
incarcerated, and implicitly accept that, under their approach, incarceration might extend for the
duration of juvenile court jurisdiction for youths deemed too dangerous to be in the
community.165 The judgment about the need for incarceration and its duration is independent of
the seriousness of the crime and the culpability of the offender.166 Thus a 10 year old could be
picked up for shoplifting and, based on a risk assessment, confined for many years.167 In short,
not only are sanctions not reduced for juveniles on the basis of immaturity, but dispositional
duration for less serious crimes is not limited by what would be proportionate punishment for
adults168.
There is much to admire in this provocative reform proposal. Slobogin and Fondocaro
employ social science research in a sophisticated way, emphasizing the merits of evidence-based
programs and locating these programs at the core of their regime. Moreover, they reject the
transfer of youths to adult court,169 although it is unclear how this could be avoided for youths
who threaten public safety in ways that can not be dealt with in the juvenile system. But,
although their aims are benign, the policy model offered by these scholars is defective in ways
that are not so different from the flaws that led to the collapse of the traditional rehabilitative
model. Open ended indeterminacy, whether based on risk assessment or diagnosis, is
unsatisfactory because it poses a substantial risk of unfairness that inevitably threatens the
legitimacy of any regime aimed solely at prevention.
Under a pure prevention model, the youth’s criminal act functions as a threshold
condition for state intervention,170 but does not otherwise determine the form or duration of the
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correctional disposition. Although the crime itself provides important information in the risk
assessment, many other factors unrelated to culpability and outside the control of the youth may
also be relevant. An accurate risk assessment may conclude that one youth is more promising
candidate for a community-based program than another whose crime was identical because the
former has more competent or invested parents, lives in a lower-crime neighborhood, has fewer
learning deficits, is involved in a sport, or has no antisocial siblings. Such factors (particularly
parental capacities) may indeed be predictive of the success or failure of evidence-based
programs, but to base the decision of whether the youth should stay in the community or be
confined in a correctional facility on considerations completely unrelated to the underlying crime
is problematic on grounds of unfairness.
The fairness problem is magnified by the likelihood that factors influencing risk
assessment are linked to race, socio-economic status and age. Thus, minority youths, youths
from single-parent homes, or those who live in poverty may be less likely to have supportive
families or other resources or attributes that are associated with lower risk of re-offending or
positive program outcome.171 If so, they may be less likely than their more fortunate peers to
qualify for community programs and more likely to be incarcerated. Moreover, substantial
evidence indicates that youths who are arrested at a very young age are at significantly higher
risk of persisting in criminal activity than those who first become involved in crime in midadolescence.172 Under a pure prevention regime, a 10 year old arrested for theft who has a history
of family, behavioral and academic problems might be a candidate for correctional interventions
that extend for as long as he is under juvenile court jurisdictions--into his twenties. Thus, the
least culpable juveniles under conventional criminal law principles would be subject to the most
intensive interventions in response to their crimes. While proponents may insist that these
discrepancies are acceptable because the dispositional purpose is not punishment but crime
reduction, this will likely offer little comfort to youths subject to more restrictive treatment than
their peers.
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To this point, we have focused on dispositional disparities that are likely to result from
accurate and unbiased risk assessment. But risk assessment is far from an exact science and will
always rely on the subjective judgments of justice system decisionmakers.173 The possibility that
decisionmakers may exaggerate the risk of re-offending by youths who belong to racial and
ethnic minority groups is substantial. Much has been written about racial and ethnic bias in the
justice system; disproportionate minority contact and confinement are broadly recognized as a
serious threat to the legitimacy of the system.174 Honest judges, probation officers and other
agents may engage in unconscious racial and ethnic stereotyping in assessing the risk of
offending by minority youths, with the result that these juveniles are subject to more restrictive
sanctions than accurate risk assessment would dictate.175 Some research evidence indicates that a
higher percentage of minority youths are transferred by judges than would be subject to adult
court jurisdiction on the basis of the crime alone.176 A regime that bases dispositions solely on
risk prediction may well result in greater disparities in the treatment of white and minority
youths.
This problem can be substantially mitigated by incorporating retribution as a limiting
principle in juvenile crime regulation. Some scholars have embraced retribution, not as the sole
(or even primary) purpose of state intervention in responding to criminal conduct, but as an
important check or side constraint on the power of the government to deprive individuals of
liberty.177 Some criminal law theorists endorse strong retributivism, under which sentences must
be proportionate to the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the offender– no more,
no less.178 Under a weaker retributivist approach, proportionality is important in limiting the
maximum severity and duration of criminal sentences and in grading offenses on the basis of
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harm. On our view, the latter approach is compatible with a model of juvenile crime regulation
that incorporates retribution as a limiting principle, but only if it avoids excessive disparities
among similarly situated young offenders. Thus under the developmental model, dispositions
may vary somewhat on the basis of preventive factors, but the range should be limited to avoid
unfairness.
This dual approach is superior to a pure prevention model in several ways. First, it
acknowledges that a part of society’s purpose in sanctioning criminals is punishment– holding
youths accountable for the harms they cause. Accountability is important to public acceptance of
any regime of crime regulation.179 The traditional model of juvenile justice collapsed in part
because proponents insisted that youths were children who were not responsible for their crimes,
a claim that ultimately had little public support. Second, young offenders themselves are likely to
benefit from the regime’s emphasis on accountability. An important developmental lesson of
adolescence is learning to accept personal responsibility for one’s choices; this lesson is
particularly important when choices cause harm to others.180 This lesson is lost under the pure
prevention approach which purposely obscures the connection between the disposition and the
underlying crime. Finally, there is evidence that offenders are more likely to comply with courtordered sanctions and less likely to re-offend when they believe that they have been subject to
fair proceedings. Thus, a regime that permitted unfair sanctioning in the service of prevention
has the potential to undermine some juveniles’ sense of “procedural justice,” thereby elevating
the risk of future criminal behavior.181
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Third, in a regime that adopts retribution as well as prevention, dispositions will be
predictable and transparently based on the youth’s criminal conduct. Within a limited range,
youths who commit similar crimes will receive sanctions of similar duration, and none will be
subject to dispositions that exceed what is fairly deserved on the basis of the youth’s culpability
and the seriousness of the offense. This is important as a matter of individual justice, but, as we
have suggested, it is also important as a means of avoiding disparate treatment of offenders on
the basis of race and ethnicity. The indeterminacy of dispositions in the traditional juvenile court
became a target of criticism not only from conservatives, who thought the system was too
lenient, but also from youth advocates, who objected to the lack of fair procedures and also to
disparities and excessive sanctions justified by the avowed rehabilitative purpose.182 Under a
regime that insists that it’s purpose is not punishment, but crime prevention, the government is
free to deprive offenders of liberty for so long as is needed to protect public safety. This will
vary widely among offenders; for some it may result in no intervention; for others the
deprivation of liberty may be far greater than is warranted on the basis of their criminal
conduct.183 This problem is reduced through the adoption of retribution as a limiting principle.
Under our developmental model of juvenile justice, the reduced culpability of most
young offenders will be recognized through correctional interventions that are shorter in duration
than those of similarly situated adult offenders. With the duration set, the disposition can and
should aim to promote social welfare by rehabilitating the youth, if necessary, and enhancing his
prospects for a non-criminal adulthood. Thus, determinate sanctions, based on both the young
offender’s reduced culpability and the seriousness of the crime, should be carried out in settings
that promote healthy development and reduce the likelihood of future offending–in the
community, if possible, or in a residential facility if necessary.
C. Are Retribution and Prevention Compatible?
The aims of fair and proportionate punishment and promotion of social welfare through
crime prevention are very different and sometimes will be in tension with one another. Can both
purposes actually be accommodated in a model of juvenile justice grounded in developmental
knowledge? In most cases, we think the answer is “yes.” Presumptively, as we explain above,
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the duration of sanctions is based on the harm of the act and the immaturity of the youth, and the
content– what happens to the youth during the period that he is in state custody– is determined
by the crime prevention goals we have described. Put differently, retribution as a limiting
principle simply restricts the amount of time allowed for the state to undertake its crime
reduction efforts as well as the harshness of the intervention. Proportionality does not require
precisely measured punishment; as we have suggested, it is compatible with a regime that
authorizes a limited range of sanctions for a given offense.
Occasionally a tension can arise between the developmental model’s two goals. For
example, a youth may commit a very serious crime that warrants incarceration in a residential
facility on proportionality grounds, but a community program is less costly and, in his case, may
be more likely to minimize the likelihood of recidivism and promote his healthy development.
In another case, removal of the youth from his family and neighborhood for an extended period
may offer the best hope of avoiding continued involvement in criminal activity, but represents a
more severe sanction than is appropriate for his crime. Moreover, as we suggested above, public
safety considerations may warrant the secure placement of some individuals convicted of a
particular serious crime—but not others. Should high-risk and low-risk youths receive the same
sentences for their similar crimes? The pure prevention approach avoids these clashes between
prevention and retribution by simply excluding retribution and proportionality as considerations.
Perhaps the most pronounced tension between preventive and retributive purposes arises
in cases involving very young offenders- aged 12 and under, who have a history of behavioral
problems. Based on their immaturity, these youths are the least culpable of juvenile offenders;
thus, fairness dictates that they should receive the most lenient interventions. But their prognosis
for reoffending is far bleaker than is that of older first offenders.184 Thus, under a regime that
cares about prevention, they should receive intensive interventions; indeed, without such
intervention, they are likely to offend again. Reconciling retribution and prevention with this
category of young offenders may be difficult, but we are not comfortable with grossly
disproportionate dispositions, based on risk assessment. On our view, the tension can be
ameliorated by combining proportionate correctional dispositions with social, educational and
psychological services that are available to children not in the justice system.185
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These hard questions are not unique to the juvenile system; they also arise in criminal
sentencing.186 In that context, courts struggle to impose fair punishment while attending to crime
prevention concerns. Many (although not all) retributivists would agree that excessive
punishment (more than is deserved on the basis of the offender’s harm and culpability) is a
greater affront to fairness than insufficient punishment.187 On this view, punishing a youth less
harshly than he deserves as a means of promoting his welfare and reducing the social cost of his
crime may be more acceptable than imposing a harsher sentence than is deserved in the interest
of reducing the likelihood that a young offender will become involved in criminal activity in the
future. However, as we have emphasized, an important element of fairness is that similar cases
be treated similarly; thus we are not sanguine about a regime in which one armed robber is sent
to a correctional institution (the deserved punishment), while another receives a community
sanction – based on judicial judgments about risk and potential for rehabilitation. This is
particularly worrisome to the extent that racial and ethnic biases play a role in sentencing. These
concerns lead us to conclude that a presumption favoring proportionate punishment is justified,
and that in hard cases, fairness should trump social welfare.
We recognize that policymakers may reach a different conclusion – and that these are
difficult choices. Fortunately, cases involving normative adolescent offenders that truly present
a conflict between fairness and social welfare are likely to be infrequent. In general, the research
evidence supports the greater use of community sanctions in dispositions for juveniles than for
adults, on grounds of social welfare, but also on grounds of proportionality. Modest sentence
variations based on social welfare concerns acknowledge the multiple goals that must be
accommodated in a satisfactory and stable system without undermining fairness excessively. A
regime that is committed to the recognition of adolescents as a distinct category, and to the
presumptively more lenient punishment of juveniles than adults, embodies the principle of
proportionality far better than the contemporary regime. The interest of justice will be served
generally by reforms that reinforce and maintain a sturdier boundary between juveniles and
adults, as long as sanctions are roughly calibrated on the basis of harm and culpability.

Conclusion
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Crime prevention and fair punishment are the two important purposes of government
response to criminal conduct; we have argued that a satisfactory system for regulating juvenile
crime must satisfy both purposes. Scientific knowledge about adolescent development provides
the basis for an approach to legal regulation that promotes social welfare by reducing crime at a
reasonable cost and that also is fair to young offenders in recognizing that they are less culpable
than their adult counterparts.
Our analysis challenges the assumption underlying the recent punitive reforms that the
public interest is best served by a response to juvenile crime that emphasizes incarceration and
deals with many young offenders as adults. To the contrary, policies that recognize that
correctional settings are developmental contexts which can inhibit or facilitate healthy
adolescent development in most young offenders are likely to be more effective at reducing the
social cost of juvenile crime. Substantial evidence supports that research-based correctional
programs in the juvenile system are likely to reduce recidivism and facilitate the transition to
normative adulthood more effectively than incarceration and at lower financial cost to society.
But a justice regime that promotes social welfare will not be adequate unless it also
incorporates principles of fair punishment. Our analysis demonstrates that fairness will be served
if juvenile sanctions are proportionate, based on the reduced blameworthiness of the young
offender and the seriousness of the offense committed. Retribution functions as a critically
important limiting principle, serving both to protect young offenders from excessive punishment
and to assure that like cases are treated similarly. This parity guards against dispositional
decisions that may disadvantage minority and low income youths, due to bias or even accurate
risk assessment. Ultimately, the legitimacy of juvenile crime policy depends on public
perception that society is subjecting all young offenders to fair punishment.
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